

for issue to officers only

DIVISION OF OPERATIONS

U. S. NAVY DEPARTMENT


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THE

HISTORY AND AIMS
OF THE OFFICE OF
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

NIBLACK



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THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE—ITS HISTORY AND AIMS.

By Rear Admiral A. P. Niblack, United States Navy, Director Naval Intelligence.

The Office of Naval Intelligence was created by Navy Department general order in the same way as two other important naval institutions, viz, the naval apprentice system and the Naval War College. In 1877 Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, United States Navy, established the Naval Training Station at Newport by using ships in commission and their personnel to train young men for the naval service; and in the same way, in 1884, he established the Naval War College, utilizing the personnel of the training station and ships connected therewith. In both cases the institutions were established by general order of the Navy Department, with no legislative action by Congress and no appropriation to make them effective. When in complete working order, and entirely successful, Congress has, in each case, shown every disposition to adopt the child left on its doorstep, in the nature of an accomplished fact. Nothing succeeds like success, and once a thing is shown to be of great practical value its future is assured.

In between the time the naval apprentice system and the Naval War College were established, the Office of Naval Intelligence was created, on March 23, 1882, by general order No. 292, signed by William H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy. There is not one word in the original order which needs, at this moment, to be modified except that it is now under naval operations instead of under the Bureau of Navigation.

An "Office of Naval Intelligence" is hereby established in the Bureau of Navigation for the purpose of collecting and recording such naval information as may be useful to the department in the time of war, as well as in peace.

To facilitate this work, the department library will be combined with the "Office of Intelligence," and placed under the direction of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

Commanding and all other officers are directed to avail themselves of all opportunities which may arise to collect and forward to the "Office of Intelligence" professional matter likely to serve the object in view.

WILLIAM H. HUNT,
Secretary of the Navy.

From its organization in 1882, to June 30, 1899, there was no clerical force authorized for the office. The clerks employed were either detailed from bureaus of the Navy Department or employed and compensated under the clause, "Increase of the Navy," in the naval appropriation bills from year to year. By the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act, effective July 1, 1899, following the Spanish-American War, a complement of clerks was provided for the office and has been renewed each year to date, with such additions as could be obtained from Congress.

When the office was established in 1882 it was assigned quarters in the State, War, and Navy Department Building, which it occupied until April, 1903, when a transfer was made to the Mills Building. In April, 1914, the office moved to the Navy Building, at 1734 New York Avenue, where it remained until February, 1918, when its quarters were transferred to Corcoran Court. It came to the new Navy Building, its present quarters, in Potomac Park, in September, 1918.

To Lieut. T. B. M. Mason, United States Navy, its first head, is due the credit for its inspiration and organization. He reported for duty June 15, 1882, and until his death, on October 15, 1899, was its leading spirit.

The first publications of Official Naval Intelligence were a war series, called "Information From Abroad," which only ran through four numbers. The "General Information Series" ran from 1883 to 1902, and these publications were as given in the appended list:

Information from Abroad.

War Series, No. I, 1883. Operations of the French Navy During the Recent Wars in Tunis.

War Series, No. II, 1883. The War on the Pacific Coast of South America between Chile and the Allied Republics of Peru and Bolivia, 1879-1881.

War Series, No. III, 1885. Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1882.

War Series, No. IV, 1893. The Chilean Revolution of 1891.

General Information Series.

No. I. 1883, Operations upon the Korean Coast, Japanese-Korean Ports, and Siberia.

No. II. 1883, Report of the Exhibits at the Crystal Palace Electrical Exhibition, 1882.

No. III. 1884, Examples, Conclusions, and Maxims of Modern Naval Tactics.

No. IV. 1885, Papers on Naval Operations During the Year Ending July, 1885.

No. V. 1886, Papers on Squadrons of Evolutions and the Recent Development of Naval Matériel.

No. VI. June, 1887, Recent Naval Progress.

No. VII. June, 1888, Naval Reserves, Training and Matériel.

No. VIII. June, 1889, Naval Mobilization and Improvement in Matériel.

No. IX. June, 1890, A Year's Naval Progress.

No. X. July, 1891, The Year's Naval Progress.

No. XI. July, 1892, Notes on the Year's Naval Progress.

No. XII. August, 1893, The International Columbian Naval Rendezvous and Review of 1893, and Naval Maneuvers of 1892.

No. XIII. July, 1894, Notes on the Year's Naval Progress.

No. XIV. July, 1895, Notes on the Year's Naval Progress.

No. XV. July, 1896, Notes on the Year's Naval Progress.

No. XVI. October, 1896, Notes on Naval Progress.

No. XVII, Part I. January, 1898, Notes on Naval Progress.

No. XVII, Part II. April, 1898, Discussion of Questions in Naval Tactics, by Vice Admiral S. J. Makaroff, I. R. N.

No. XVIII. November, 1899, Notes on Naval Progress.

No. XIX. July, 1900, Notes on Naval Progress.

No. XX. July, 1901, Notes on Naval Progress.

No. XXI. July, 1902, Notes on Naval Progress.

Another series of publications called "War Notes" ran through eight volumes, and were later bound in one publication under the title "Notes on the Spanish-American War," 1900.

War Notes.

No. I. Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba.

No. II. Comments of Rear Admiral Plueddemann, German Navy, on the Main Features of the War with Spain.

No. III. Sketches from the Spanish-American War, by Commander J——.

No. IV. Sketches from the Spanish-American War, by Commander J——.

No. V. Effects of the Gunfire of the United States Vessels in the Battle of Manila Bay.

No. VI. The Spanish-American War—Blockades and Coast Defense.

No. VII. The Spanish-American War—A Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies.

No. VIII. The Squadron of Admiral Cervera, by Capt. Victor M. Concas Y. Palau.

In 1888 was published "Coaling, Docking, and Repairing Facilities of the Ports of the World with Analyses of Different Kinds of Coal." This ran through four editions up to 1900 with a supplement

in 1905. It was reissued in 1911 under "Port Directory of the Principal Foreign Ports."

At the time of the organization of the office the work which was undertaken was compiling information as to docking facilities of the world; foreign navies; foreign ports; foreign naval personnel; submarine cables and telegraph lines; operations of foreign naval landing forces from time to time; naval maneuvers; coaling stations; new inventions and patents; engineering resources of the United States; manufacturers of material suitable for the United States Navy; resources of the United States for war matériel and personnel for naval purposes; ships fit for auxiliary naval purposes; mobilization; provisions; clothing; targets and target practice; inspection of merchant vessels; naval reserve and coast defense; depots, bases, dockyards, harbors, fortifications, operations, war maps and all details of the United States Army; commerce and trade routes, etc.

The foregoing is merely an outline of the activities of the office from June 15, 1882, for only the first three years, during which early stages some of our finest officers gave their services to this office. The following is a list of the subsequent Directors of Naval Intelligence and their years of service:

Name.	From—	To—
Mason, T. B. M.....	June 15, 1882	Apr. 2, 1885
Rodgers, Raymond P.....	Apr. 2, 1885	July 22, 1889
Davis, Charles H.....	Sept. 16, 1889	Aug. 31, 1892
Chadwick, French E.....	Sept. 2, 1892	June 20, 1893
Singer, Frederic.....	June 30, 1893	Apr. 4, 1896
Wainwright, Richard.....	Apr. 4, 1896	Nov. 15, 1897
Clover, Richardson.....	Nov. 15, 1897	May 1, 1898
Bartlett, John R.....	May 1, 1898	Oct. 15, 1898
Clover, Richardson.....	Oct. 15, 1898	Feb. 1, 1900
Sigsbee, Charles D.....	Feb. 1, 1900	Apr. 30, 1903
Schroeder, Seaton.....	May 1, 1903	Apr. 18, 1906
Rodgers, Raymond P.....	Apr. 18, 1906	May 11, 1909
Vreeland, Charles E.....	May 11, 1909	Dec. 17, 1909
Potts, Templin M.....	Dec. 17, 1909	Jan. 25, 1912
Rodgers, Thomas S.....	Jan. 25, 1912	Dec. 15, 1913
Bryan, Henry F.....	Dec. 15, 1913	Jan. 20, 1914
Oliver, James H.....	Jan. 20, 1914	Mar. 28, 1917
Welles, Roger.....	Apr. 16, 1917	Jan. 31, 1919
Niblack, Albert P.....	May 1, 1919

It must be clearly understood that the Office of Naval Intelligence, from its inception, has been based on the proposition of having naval attachés abroad to collect information. Herewith is appended a list of the first naval attachés who have opened up offices at the various capitals mentioned. From the time they were established reliefs were sent on the expiration of the tours of the duty. The list given merely indicates the first officers to go to these posts. The post at Caracas,

Venezuela, was only for an emergency, and has not been kept up. During the recent war the office of naval attaché was revived at Madrid, and several other European capitals, and established at Montevideo, Uruguay; Lima, Peru; and Quito, Ecuador. The posts which were established during the war will probably continue to be maintained, except possibly at Warsaw and Montevideo.

Since the establishment of the naval attaché system in 1882 attachés have been accredited to 23 foreign capitals—13 in Europe, 2 in the Orient, 7 in South America, and 1 in the West Indies. There have been 149 individual detail of officers to this duty. The list of first attachés is as follows:

Capital.	Name.	From—	To—
London.....	Lieut. Commander French E. Chadwick.	Oct. 28, 1882	Apr. 3, 1889
Paris.....	Lieut. Benjamin H. Buckingham.	Nov. 11, 1885	Mar. 30, 1889
Petrograd (St. Petersburg).	do.....	do.....	Feb. 23, 1889
Berlin.....	do.....	do.....	Feb. 8, 1889
Rome.....	Lieut. Nathan Sargent.....	Nov. 20, 1888	Aug. 31, 1895
Vienna.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Tokyo.....	Commander Francis M. Barber.	Feb. 4, 1895	Dec. 28, 1893
Peking.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Madrid.....	Lieut. William S. Sims.....	Feb. 16, 1897	Aug. 10, 1897
Caracas.....	Lieut. Marbury Johnston.....	Jan. 8, 1903	Sept. 20, 1903
Buenos Aires.....	Commander Albert P. Niblack.	July 1, 1910	Nov. 24, 1911
Rio de Janeiro.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Santiago de Chile.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
The Hague.....	Lieut. Commander Frederick A. Traut.	May 31, 1911	Oct. 9, 1911
Copenhagen.....	Lieut. Col. John C. Breckenridge, U. S. M. C.	Aug. 25, 1917	Apr. 8, 1918
Christiania.....	do.....	do.....	Sept. 5, 1918
Stockholm.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Lima.....	Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson (retired).	Nov. 7, 1917	Nov. 25, 1919
Quito.....	do.....	do.....	Do.
Habana.....	Lieut. Commander (T) Carlos V. Cusachs (Math.)	Apr. 17, 1918	Apr. 15, 1919
Lisbon.....	Lieut. Commander Edward Breck (U. S. N. R. F.).	May 25, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919
Montevideo.....	Lieut. Charles B. Dana (U. S. N. R. F.).	Sept. 30, 1918	July 30, 1919
Warsaw.....	Capt. David C. Hanrahan (T)..	Apr. 25, 1919	July 7, 1919

It has always been the fundamental principle of the naval attaché detail that the officer selected should come to Washington for temporary duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and, by looking over the files, visiting all the technical bureaus of the Navy Department, and various shipyards and shipbuilding plants, put himself quite up-to-date in all matters relating to the progress in personnel and material in our own country, and in the United States Navy in particular.

Arriving at his post, it has been the policy to have the new attaché thoroughly instructed by the officer to be relieved and, as far as possible, place himself in the exact position, and in possession of all the information of the officer to be relieved. This period has varied from two weeks to a month, and has been regarded as of the utmost importance. At the end of the time, the arriving attaché has taken over the position and the officer relieved has been ordered to duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence to go over all of his reports and bring his information up to date. The fundamental assumption of the Office of Naval Intelligence has been that it exists largely for the benefit of, and for the support of, the naval attachés abroad, because loyal service can only be had by loyal support of the attachés.

It should be noted that when the war with Germany came, in April, 1917, the Office of Naval Intelligence had had a naval attaché at Berlin, practically without break, for thirty-one and one-half years. No other Government had had a naval attaché there for anything like this period. The British did not begin seriously until about 1903. The success of our attachés in Berlin in obtaining information of a technical and political character during this entire time has been unquestioned. The method of obtaining information in foreign countries has been principally by exchanging information of equal importance, and the acquisition of information of any questionable method has been strictly frowned upon. It has been the aim of the office to use only reputable business methods and avoid anything savoring of "gum-shoe" methods. This point can not be too strongly emphasized.

One of the difficulties in finding suitable officers to go as naval attaché has been that the allowances for maintenance have been ridiculously small and officers have had to volunteer for the duty with the full knowledge that their pay and allowance would not prove sufficient to meet their expenses. There has seldom been a case where a naval attaché has gone abroad where he could live on his pay and perform the duty expected of him. This fact has led to the inference that only officers with private means could afford to take the positions, and it has therefore created an unreasonable prejudice and gratuitous assumption that the position of naval attaché was somewhat of a sinecure. Unfortunately, also, the policy has never been rigidly adhered to of choosing Directors of Naval Intelligence from officers who have previously had experience as naval attachés. So far, about one-third of the directors have had previous experience in the field.

While a knowledge of foreign languages is very desirable, this has not been insisted upon, because the suitability of the officer in other respects has been the determining factor. Given the knowledge of methods and the desire to acquire information, the knowledge of

the language is somewhat secondary. What the Office of Naval Intelligence has sought has been results, but unquestionably this war has modified all our views and called for a more elastic and broad organization.

The following are the lists of the various officers who have served as naval attachés at the various posts:

LONDON.

Name.	From—	To—
Lieut. Commander French E. Chadwick.....	Nov. 15, 1882	Apr. 3, 1889
Lieut. Benjamin H. Buckingham.....	Apr. 3, 1889	Dec. 23, 1889
Lieut. Commander William H. Emory.....	Dec. 23, 1889	Jan. 16, 1893
Lieut. Commander William S. Cowles.....	Jan. 4, 1893	Apr. 2, 1897
Lieut. John C. Colwell.....	Apr. 21, 1897	Apr. 1, 1900
Commander Richardson Clover.....	Apr. 2, 1900	June 1, 1903
Capt. Charles H. Stockton.....	June 1, 1903	Dec. 30, 1905
Lieut. Commander John H. Gibbons.....	Dec. 27, 1905	June 15, 1909
Commander Edward Simpson.....	June 15, 1909	Oct. 1, 1912
Commander Powers Symington.....	Oct. 1, 1912	Oct. 21, 1916
Capt. William D. MacDougall.....	Sept. 18, 1916	Dec. 12, 1917
Rear Admiral William S. Sims.....	Dec. 13, 1917	Mar. 31, 1919
Rear Admiral Henry S. Knapp.....	Mar. 31, 1919

PARIS.

Lieut. Benjamin H. Buckingham.....	Dec. 1, 1885	Mar. 30, 1889
Lieut. Aaron Ward.....	Mar. 1, 1889	Oct. 1, 1892
Lieut. Raymond P. Rodgers.....	Oct. 1, 1892	Apr. 30, 1897
Lieut. William S. Sims.....	Apr. 30, 1897	June 1, 1900
Commander Giles B. Harber.....	May 5, 1900	Aug. 5, 1903
Lieut. Commander Roy C. Smith.....	Aug. 5, 1903	Aug. 22, 1906
Commander John C. Fremont.....	Aug. 22, 1906	Jan. 31, 1908
Lieut. Commander Frederick L. Chapin.....	Jan. 31, 1908	Feb. 15, 1911
Lieut. Commander Henry H. Hough.....	Feb. 15, 1911	Feb. 15, 1914
Lieut. Commander Samuel I. M. Major.....	Feb. 15, 1914	Oct. 27, 1914
Lieut. Commander William F. Bricker.....	Oct. 16, 1914	Mar. 1, 1915
Lieut. Commander William R. Sayles.....	Mar. 1, 1915	June 10, 1915
Capt. Richard H. Jackson.....	June 11, 1915	Nov. 10, 1918
Rear Admiral (T) Andrew T. Long.....	Oct. 17, 1918	Dec. 5, 1919
Capt. Thomas P. Magruder.....	Dec. 6, 1919

PETROGRAD (ST. PETERSBURG).

Lieut. Benjamin H. Buckingham.....	Dec. 31, 1885	Feb. 23, 1889
Lieut. Aaron Ward.....	Mar. 1, 1889	Oct. 1, 1892
Lieut. Raymond P. Rodgers.....	Oct. 1, 1892	Apr. 30, 1897
Lieut. William S. Sims.....	Mar. 8, 1897	June 1, 1900
Commander Giles B. Harber.....	May 5, 1900	Aug. 5, 1903
Lieut. Commander Roy C. Smith.....	Aug. 5, 1903	Aug. 22, 1906
Commander John C. Fremont.....	Aug. 22, 1906	Jan. 31, 1908
Lieut. Commander Frederick L. Chapin.....	Jan. 31, 1908	Feb. 15, 1911
Lieut. Commander Henry H. Hough.....	Feb. 15, 1911	Feb. 15, 1914
Lieut. Commander Samuel I. M. Major.....	Feb. 15, 1914	Oct. 27, 1914
Capt. Newton A. McCully.....	Oct. 6, 1914	July 16, 1917
Commander Walter S. Crosley.....	May 6, 1917	Apr. 30, 1918

BERLIN.

Name.	From—	To—
Lieut. Benjamin H. Buckingham.....	Dec. 1, 1885	Feb. 8, 1889
Lieut. Aaron Ward.....	Mar. 1, 1889	Oct. 1, 1892
Lieut. Nathan Sargent.....	Oct. 1, 1892	Aug. 31, 1893
Lieut. Charles E. Vreeland.....	Aug. 3, 1893	Dec. 24, 1896
Lieut. Albert P. Niblack.....	Jan. 4, 1897	May 3, 1898
Commander Francis M. Barber (retired).....	May 3, 1898	Feb. 21, 1899
Lieut. Commander William H. Beehler.....	Feb. 21, 1899	Oct. 1, 1902
Lieut. Commander Templin M. Potts.....	Oct. 1, 1902	May 19, 1904
Lieut. Commander William L. Howard.....	Oct. 1, 1904	Jan. 6, 1908
Lieut. Commander Reginald R. Belknap.....	Nov. 30, 1907	Sept. 30, 1910
Lieut. Commander Frederick A. Traut.....	Oct. 1, 1910	Oct. 9, 1911
Capt. Albert P. Niblack.....	Dec. 30, 1911	July 1, 1913
Lieut. Commander Walter R. Gherardi.....	July 1, 1913	Feb. 10, 1917

ROME.

Lieut. Nathan Sargent.....	Dec. 15, 1888	Aug. 31, 1893
Lieut. Charles E. Vreeland.....	June 10, 1893	Dec. 24, 1896
Lieut. Albert P. Niblack.....	Jan. 4, 1897	May 3, 1898
Commander Francis M. Barber (retired).....	May 3, 1898	Feb. 21, 1899
Lieut. Commander William H. Beehler.....	Feb. 21, 1899	Oct. 1, 1902
Lieut. Commander Templin M. Potts.....	Oct. 1, 1902	May 19, 1904
Lieut. Commander William L. Howard.....	Oct. 1, 1904	Jan. 6, 1908
Commander John B. Bernadou.....	Jan. 21, 1907	Oct. 2, 1908
Lieut. Commander Reginald R. Belknap.....	Oct. 13, 1908	Sept. 3, 1909
Commander Andrew T. Long.....	Sept. 2, 1909	Sept. 1, 1912
Lieut. Commander Richard D. White.....	Sept. 1, 1912	June 30, 1914
Lieut. Commander Charles R. Train.....	June 30, 1914	Apr. 20, 1919
Capt. (T) Joseph M. Reeves.....	Apr. 21, 1919

¹ Died.

VIENNA.

Lieut. Nathan Sargent.....	Dec. 15, 1888	Aug. 31, 1893
Lieut. Charles E. Vreeland.....	July 19, 1893	Dec. 24, 1896
Lieut. Albert P. Niblack.....	Jan. 4, 1897	May 3, 1898
Commander Francis M. Barber (retired).....	May 3, 1898	Feb. 21, 1899
Lieut. Commander William H. Beehler.....	Feb. 21, 1899	Oct. 1, 1902
Lieut. Commander Templin M. Potts.....	Oct. 1, 1902	May 19, 1904
Lieut. Commander William L. Howard.....	Oct. 1, 1904	Jan. 20, 1907
Commander John B. Bernadou.....	Jan. 21, 1907	Oct. 2, 1908
Lieut. Commander Reginald R. Belknap.....	Oct. 13, 1908	Sept. 3, 1909
Commander Andrew T. Long.....	Sept. 2, 1909	Sept. 1, 1912
Lieut. Commander Richard D. White.....	Sept. 1, 1912	June 30, 1914
Lieut. Commander Charles R. Train.....	June 30, 1914	Aug. 26, 1914
Commander Stephen V. Graham.....	Aug. 26, 1914	Apr. 14, 1917

¹ Died.

TOKYO.

Name.	From—	To—
Commander Francis M. Barber.....	Feb. 4, 1895	Dec. 28, 1895
Lieut. Albert L. Key.....	Nov. 8, 1898	Nov. 30, 1901
Lieut. Commander Charles C. Marsh.....	Nov. 30, 1901	Jan. 6, 1905
Lieut. Irvin V. Gillis.....	Jan. 6, 1905	Apr. 1, 1905
Lieut. Frank Marble.....	Apr. 1, 1905	Apr. 10, 1907
Commander John A. Dougherty.....	Apr. 10, 1907	Jan. 16, 1909 ¹
Capt. James H. Sears.....	Jan. 16, 1909	June 30, 1910
Capt. John H. Shipley.....	June 30, 1910	Dec. 13, 1911
Lieut. Commander Lyman A. Cotten.....	Feb. 12, 1912	Jan. 15, 1915
Lieut. Commander Frederick J. Horne.....	Dec. 30, 1914	Mar. 15, 1919
Capt. (T) Edward H. Watson.....	Mar. 6, 1919	

PEKING.

Commander Francis M. Barber.....	Feb. 4, 1895	Dec. 28, 1895
Lieut. Albert L. Key.....	Nov. 8, 1898	Nov. 30, 1901
Lieut. Commander Charles C. Marsh.....	Nov. 30, 1901	Jan. 6, 1905
Lieut. Irvin V. Gillis.....	Jan. 6, 1905	Apr. 1, 1905
Lieut. Frank Marble.....	Apr. 1, 1905	Apr. 10, 1907
Commander John A. Dougherty.....	Apr. 10, 1907	Sept. 16, 1907
Lieut. Commander Irvin V. Gillis.....	Sept. 16, 1907	July 31, 1908
Capt. James H. Sears.....	Jan. 16, 1909	June 30, 1910
Capt. John H. Shipley.....	June 30, 1910	Dec. 13, 1911
Lieut. Commander Lyman A. Cotten.....	Feb. 12, 1912	Sept. 30, 1914
Lieut. Commander Charles T. Hutchins.....	Sept. 30, 1914	Mar. 1, 1916
Commander Irvin V. Gillis (retired).....	May 1, 1917	Aug. 21, 1919
Commander (T) Charles T. Hutchins.....	Sept. 30, 1919	

¹ Died.

MADRID.

Lieut. William S. Sims.....	Feb. 16, 1897	Aug. 10, 1897
Lieut. George L. Dyer.....	July 1, 1897	Apr. 17, 1898
Capt. Benton C. Decker.....	May 26, 1917	May 10, 1918
Capt. (T) Walter S. Crosley.....	May 10, 1918	Nov. 14, 1918
Capt. (T) Chester Wells.....	Nov. 15, 1918	

CARACAS.

Lieut. Marbury Johnston.....	Jan. 8, 1903	Sept. 20, 1903
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BUENOS AIRES.

Commander Albert P. Niblack.....	July 1, 1910	Nov. 24, 1911
Lieut. Commander Robert W. McNeely.....	Jan. 28, 1912	Dec. 27, 1912
Lieut. Guy Whitlock.....	Apr. 21, 1913	Nov. 20, 1914
Capt. John H. Gibbons (retired).....	Nov. 13, 1917	

RIO DE JANEIRO.

Name.	From—	To—
Commander Albert P. Niblack.....	July 1, 1910	Nov. 24, 1911
Commander Philip Williams.....	Aug. 12, 1914	Oct. 31, 1914
Capt. Frank K. Hill (retired).....	May 17, 1917	

SANTIAGO DE CHILE.

Commander Albert P. Niblack.....	July 1, 1910	Nov. 24, 1911
Lieut. Commander Alfred W. Johnston.....	May 9, 1912	Dec. 31, 1913
Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson (retired).....	Nov. 7, 1917	Nov. 25, 1919
Capt. Edward H. Durell.....	Nov. 25, 1919	

THE HAGUE.

Lieut. Commander Frederick A. Traut.....	May 31, 1911	Oct. 9, 1911
Capt. Albert P. Niblack.....	Dec. 30, 1911	July 1, 1913
Lieut. Commander Walter R. Gherardi.....	July 1, 1913	Feb. 10, 1917
Lieut. (J. G.) Eugene D. McCormick.....	Apr. 11, 1917	Oct. 3, 1919
Commander (T) David W. Bagley.....	Oct. 3, 1919	

COPENHAGEN.

Lieut. Col. John C. Ereckenridge (U. S. M. C.).....	Aug. 25, 1917	Apr. 8, 1918
Lieut. Commander John A. Gade (U. S. N. R. F.).....	Apr. 8, 1918	May 15, 1919
Col. (T) Arthur T. Marix (U. S. M. C.).....	May 15, 1919	Sept. 27, 1919
Capt. (T) Kenneth G. Castleman.....	Sept. 27, 1919	

CHRISTIANIA.

Lieut. Col. John C. Ereckenridge (U. S. M. C.).....	Aug. 25, 1917	Sept. 5, 1918
Col. (T) Arthur T. Marix (U. S. M. C.).....	Sept. 5, 1918	Sept. 27, 1919
Capt. (T) Kenneth G. Castleman.....	Sept. 27, 1919	

STOCKHOLM.

Lieut. Col. John C. Breckenridge (U. S. M. C.).....	Aug. 25, 1917	Sept. 5, 1918
Col. (T) Arthur T. Marix (U. S. M. C.).....	Sept. 5, 1918	Sept. 27, 1919
Capt. (T) Kenneth G. Castleman.....	Sept. 27, 1919	

LIMA.

Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson (retired).....	Nov. 7, 1917	Nov. 25, 1919
Capt. Edward H. Durell.....	Nov. 25, 1919	

QUITO.

Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson (retired).....	Nov. 7, 1917	Nov. 25, 1919
Capt. Edward H. Durell.....	Nov. 25, 1919	

HAVANA.

Name.	From—	To—
Lieut. Commander (T) Carlos V. Cusachs (Math.)...	May 15, 1918	Apr. 15, 1919

LISBON.

Lieut. Commander Edward Breck (U. S. N. R. F.)...	May 25, 1918	Mar. 15, 1919
Lieut. George A. Dorsey (U. S. N. R. F.).....	May 26, 1919	

MONTEVIDEO.

Lieut. Charles B. Dana (U. S. N. R. F.).....	Sept. 30, 1918	July 30, 1919
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WARSAW.

Capt. (T) David C. Hanrahan.....	May 2, 1919	July 14, 1919
Capt. (T) Clarence A. Abele.....	July 14, 1919	

Before describing the peace and war organization of O. N. I., it is well to recognize that Military Information Division has much more complex duties, not only in keeping track of enemy activities within our own borders and foiling them, but in expanding and coordinating all the military resources of the country. The Navy is always ready for war or on a tentative war footing with some trained reserves to draw upon. It is a comparatively simple matter to pass from a peace to a war footing. Intensive target practice, torpedo exercises, mine laying exercises and maneuvers keep the personnel deeply interested through the competitive spirit. It is the duty of the Navy to hold the enemy in check while the Army mobilizes and deploys. Curiously enough, naval strategy may be planned in time of peace by building stations, acquiring bases, and studying all the elements of the possible enemy's strategy, but an army can not acquire supply bases or fortified stations in the same way in time of peace. A navy is not efficient unless it is always on a tentative war footing, for when war comes you can not improvise a navy. We have never done anything else than improvise an army.

There is some wisdom in calling our Division of Operations by that name rather than by that of General Staff, as the word describes its functions. All operations are based primarily on information and communications. The Navy has developed the art of communications to a degree the Army hardly realizes. It also realizes the importance of information. Its existence depends upon it, yet a

moment's reflection will show that only accurate and timely information bestows the power of the initiative, which, if properly used, may be the decisive factor in a struggle. Talent is of no avail if a general or admiral is provided with false or greatly delayed information, but the advantage given to a force by early and accurate information implies the necessity also of denying information to the enemy. Information is, therefore, the groundwork upon which all plans are constructed. Let us outline what information it is important to ascertain.

We should know in time of peace the policies of the various Governments and the dangers which may arise from the antagonism of our policies with theirs. We should study their forms of government and the natural characteristics. We should ascertain their military, naval, and financial resources and the strength, disposition, state of preparation, and efficiency of their naval forces. We should try to find out the personal characteristics of prominent naval officers and the prevailing ideas of strategy and tactics. We should see that the charts of probable theaters of operations are on hand in adequate quantities, and that special studies shall be made of them in every detail.

When war breaks we have to know as much as possible of the enemy's plan of operations, the composition and disposition of the naval forces he has available, their condition as to morale, food, and supplies, and finally the actual movements of his forces.

In time of peace our sources of information are (1) naval attachés; (2) consular reports; (3) State Department "dispatches" (reports from ambassadors and ministers); (4) files of O. N. I.; (5) reports of intelligence officers of ships of the Navy; (6) tourists, business men, newspaper correspondents, and commercial travelers; (7) commercial reports of business firms; (8) newspapers and periodicals; and (9) agents.

In time of war information is obtained through agents, code breaking, travelers, and spies.

There are several sources of information alluded to in the foregoing which need explanation. In time of peace an officer is designated on each ship as intelligence officer and it is his duty to forward reports on every port visited and to act as agent of O. N. I. Another source is "code breaking." All enemy messages in cipher must be deciphered by the art of "code breaking," which must, in time of peace, be studied and mastered. A very fruitful, and never properly utilized, source of information is from travelers who should be questioned first on arrival at any point. People on first arriving are full of enthusiastic information which gradually fades into indifference as time passes. Under any circumstances, getting information requires a good and carefully planned organization.

The following are some of the United States Naval Regulations regarding the Office of Naval Intelligence. The first page of the book is as follows:

CHAPTER I.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Section I.—Office of Naval Intelligence.

1. (1) The Office of Naval Intelligence shall keep a record of all naval information furnished by the Navy Department to foreign naval administrations, and of all similar information furnished by foreign naval administrations to the Navy Department.

(2) To relieve foreign ambassadors and ministers from some degree of formal correspondence, foreign naval attachés are authorized to communicate directly with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Further authorization of communication is not given, since it is desirable, for the maintenance of a correct record, that there shall be only a single channel of communication. Professional visits to the Navy Department by foreign naval attachés, excepting the usual visits of courtesy, are expected to be made to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(3) Chiefs of bureaus and other department officers desiring information from foreign Governments, shall obtain the same by means of a memorandum of the required information furnished by the Director of Naval Intelligence.

(4) Information for attachés or other foreign officials in Washington or abroad shall be furnished through the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(5) All correspondence with United States naval attachés shall be under the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(6) By the term "Information" as employed in this article is meant all information of value, either printed, written, or verbal.

(7) All reports and letters from naval attachés shall be addressed to the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, which office shall, without delay, furnish the several bureaus and offices of the department with such information in regard to such reports and letters as may be of interest to them.

(8) Receipt shall be required and given for papers taken from the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence for the use of bureaus and offices.

(9) When information of special professional interest is received by any bureau or office of the department, a memorandum of the same shall be furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence in order that all such information may be registered and carded in that office for future reference, and that requests may not be made to foreign Governments for information already in possession of the Navy Department.

Section 2.—Officers Ordered to a Foreign Country.

6. (1) No officer of the Navy or of the Marine Corps shall proceed to a foreign country on special duty connected with the service except under orders prepared by the Bureau of Navigation or by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the case may be, and signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

(2) A copy of each such order shall immediately be filed in the Bureau of Navigation and in the *Office of Naval Intelligence*.

(3) The Bureau of Navigation shall in each such case prepare a letter for the Secretary's signature informing the Department of State of the intended visit

and the general nature only of the duty on which the officer is to be sent, in order that the diplomatic representatives of the United States in the countries to be visited may be informed in regard thereto.

(4) The written official report made by any such officer with respect to his mission shall be transmitted by him to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further reference and ultimate file.

Article 707 of the Naval Instructions is as follows:

707. (7) The Director of Naval Intelligence shall report to the Bureau of Navigation the names of all officers who, from reports submitted, have excellent local or general knowledge of any place, or show special aptitude for intelligence work.

Article 714 of the Naval Instructions is as follows:

714. (1) Permission to make photographs, photographic plates or films, or moving picture films of naval vessels or parts thereof; of navy yards and stations, or of any establishments under the jurisdiction of the Navy; or of any device belonging to the Navy or intended for use thereof, shall be granted only by the Navy Department (Office of Naval Intelligence), under such detailed instructions as may be issued by general order.

(2) No person, not in the naval service, shall be allowed to take on board any naval vessel, nor into any navy yard, station, or establishment under the jurisdiction of the Navy, any photographic apparatus, without displaying written permission from proper authority.

(3) All photographs taken on board ship, or in naval establishments ashore by persons belonging to the Navy shall be submitted for censorship to the commanding officer or the commandant, as the case may be, or to a responsible officer designated by him, and if condemned shall be destroyed, together with the films from which printed.

The duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence, as given in the foregoing regulations, are largely administrative. The specific orders under which the office operates for war purposes is best given in the instructions to naval attachés and others in regard to intelligence duty, issued in 1917:

- (1) The fleets of foreign powers.
- (2) The war material of foreign powers.
- (3) The nautical personnel of foreign powers, and a general record of the strength, organization, and distribution of all foreign naval forces.
- (4) The war resources of foreign powers.
- (5) Doctrine of foreign powers. Foreign policies and relations.
- (6) Characteristics of foreign naval officers of command rank.
- (7) Defenses and armaments of foreign ports.
- (8) Time required for the mobilization of foreign navies and the probable form and places of mobilization.
- (9) The lines and means of water communication of foreign countries and their facilities for transporting troops overseas.
- (10) The adaptability of foreign private-owned vessels to war purposes and the routes followed by regular steamer lines.
- (11) The facilities for obtaining coal, fuel oil, gasoline, and supplies, and for having repairs made in all foreign ports of the world.
- (12) Climatic, sanitary, and other peculiarities of foreign countries which can have a bearing upon naval operations.

- (13) The facilities on foreign coasts for landing men and supplies and means for supporting detached bodies of troops in the interior.
- (14) The canals and interior waterways of the United States and foreign countries available for the passage of torpedo boats and other naval craft.
- (15) The collating and keeping up to date of data relating to the inspection and assignmet of merchant vessels under United States registry and of such foreign private-owned vessels as may be indicated.
- (16) Through correspondence with owners, consulting trade journals, and by any other practical means keeping track of the status and location of different United States merchant vessels listed as auxiliaries for war; of sales to other lines; and of changes in trade routes or terminal ports which may make necessary a change in the yard designated for war preparation; and to report such changes in the list of ships to the department for its information, the information of the General Board, and the Board of Inspection and Survey, in order that a further inspection of particular ships may be made, if necessary.

With the approach of war with Germany, there arose the necessity for the Office of Naval Intelligence to interest itself in alien activities in this country. The operation of the Office of Naval Intelligence at the beginning of and during the war can best be described from quoting from a report of Rear Admiral Roger Welles, United States Navy, who was Director of Naval Intelligence during that period, as follows:

Our National Government comes into contact with the alien in at least 16 different ways, through 14 different bureaus and divisions in the departments of State, Treasury, Post Office, Interior, Agricultural, Commerce and Labor. It was soon realized that the alien was in every community and every activity of our national life, and our Government has apparently never looked upon the alien as constituting a unified problem. With a very large portion of our entire population of foreign birth, or with at least one foreign parent, the importance and danger of this alien party greatly increased upon our entering the war. Over 3,000,000 of our population are foreign, about 14,000,000 German, or of German descent, and they appear in every industry and in every activity from those of the best skilled to those of the meanest manual labor.

Shortly after America entered the war an agent of the Office of Naval Intelligence visited one of our largest shipyards and learned that the management was quite unaware as to how many enemy aliens there were in the yard. In fact the location and activities of those aliens had never been considered and yet the work of a single enemy agent could retard the work of the yard for months. The fact that enemy aliens were constantly being discharged and left without means of support aggravated the situation. Sometimes they were permitted to remain in highly technical and secret industries when they might have been shifted to places where they could do no harm.

The work of the Naval Intelligence Office has been one of increasing power and the result of cooperative achievements.

There were in Washington at least eight intelligence organizations each headed by a different department of the Government and, through gentlemen's agreements and individual cooperation, working without any attempt at coordination. The organization in every naval district of an intelligence service

similar, in many respects, to the central organization was immediately begun and was created to promote and coordinate the work of the central organization. An aide for information was appointed to direct the work in each district and in all cases there was appropriated to these aides considerable funds by Washington.

At the outbreak of the European War a greater part of our foreign commerce was handled by persons who were not citizens of the United States. It was not until November, 1914, that any American bank had a branch abroad.

It was well known in this country that the Germans had established a wonderful spy system through which Berlin was being informed of the activities in every branch of industry in this country. It is probable that there was not a manufacturing establishment here that did not have at least one paid agent of the German Government who kept that Government informed of everything that was going on. There is no doubt that even in the departments at Washington, German agents were at work at all times. It was supposed that bases of some sort for the supplying of gasoline and supplies to German submarines were being secretly established at different points along the coast of Mexico, Central and South America. Before the United States entered the war Germans were allowed to enter this country freely.

The day the United States declared war the activities of the Office of Naval Intelligence were increased tremendously for it became the duty of this office to not only continue its peace time activities but to form an investigation section to seek out the Germans who had been active in propaganda in favor of Germany; who were attempting to prevent by sabotage, by explosions, by fomenting strikes and by many other ways, the manufacture of munitions of war; who were making bombs for the purpose of blowing up our ships and factories; and in general to prevent the activities of Germans and German sympathizers from continuing their nefarious pursuits.

This meant the expanding of the office in Washington tremendously, the reorganization of its personnel and extending its activities to every country of the globe as well as covering every State of the Union.

The United States had, by direction of the Secretary of the Navy, been divided into 15 naval districts. Those districts covered the whole coast of the United States—the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, Great Lakes, in addition to Hawaii and the Canal Zone. The naval activities of each district were in charge of an officer known as the commandant. In each district there was an aide for information, who acted at first directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence at Washington. Each district was further subdivided into sections in each of which was appointed a section aide for information who reported directly to the district aide for information. The activities of these aides, especially in our large ports of entry such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, etc., were tremendous.

The work handled by these district organizations was outlined by the central organization and included the following: First, subjects to be investigated by the aide for information:

(A) Navy Personnel.

(1) Apprehension of deserters and stragglers; investigations and surveillance of enlisted men reported by the commanding officers of all United States ships; reported imposters appearing in the uniform of the Navy.

(2) Suspects attempting to enlist in the United States Navy, or United States Naval Reserve Force.

(3) Collusion between firms holding Navy contracts and enlisted men.

(4) Cooperation with other naval districts in the investigation of cases reported by them which fall within the field covered by the aide for information.

(B) Navy Yard Employees.

- (1) Investigation and surveillance of navy yard suspects.
- (2) Investigation of reported pro-Germanism of navy-yard employees.
- (3) Thefts from the navy yard.
- (4) Cases referred by commandant relating to the naval establishment.
- (5) Investigation of labor agitation connected with the navy yard.

(C) Miscellaneous Investigations.

- (1) All cases referred by the mail censorship bureau.
- (2) Investigations of suspicious individuals reported in the vicinity of Navy piers, wharves, docks, warehouses, etc.
- (3) Investigation of applicants for pilot licenses.
- (4) Investigation of cases involving radio and radio apparatus.
- (5) Investigation of suspicious fires on piers, docks, and wharves under the Navy Department.
- (6) Protection of shipyards within the naval district doing Navy work, and of naval vessels building or repairing within those shipyards.
- (7) Protection of the operation, product and personnel of plants manufacturing munitions or other material for the Navy, other than those covered by the branch Office of Naval Intelligence.
- (8) Investigation of enemy agents and sympathizers, and civilians concerning any activities inimicable to the interests of the Navy.
- (9) Investigation of addressees of such cables as may be referred to the aide for information by the cable censor.

In order to carry on these investigations a large number of men were enlisted whose qualifications showed them to be particularly fitted for this sort of work.

The investigation department of each aide for information was by no means the only work done by them for an equally important job was the ship inspection. In order to keep out undesirable aliens a system of ship inspection was inaugurated in every port of entry in the United States by which the passengers and crew of each ship entering a port from a neutral country were lined up on deck, carefully inspected to determine whether their passports and papers were in due form and technically correct. The ship itself was examined from truck to keel to discover any unauthorized German literature to be used as propaganda or other contraband material that might be on board. This inspection was very strict indeed and it is believed resulted in preventing Germany from communicating with agents in this and other American countries. Every ship sailing from a neutral country was reported by our naval attaché abroad and any suspicious person aboard was also reported. Upon arriving in the United States such person was given a very rigid examination and if anything suspicious was found on his person or among his baggage he was taken into custody by the Department of Justice and either deported or interned. This ship, passenger, and crew inspection work was conducted always in cooperation and in company with customs inspectors of each port of entry.

In connection with suspicious vessels the following typical instances, which were discovered, may be cited:

Adelina.—Whole crew pro-German, to be watched especially when forming part of convoy.

Adonis.—Carrying contraband, New York to West Indies.

Adolfo.—Sailed from Seville, Spain, August 23, 1917, practically in ballast, without notification of departure to consulate at Seville. On last trip was stopped and examined by a German submarine and allowed to proceed.

Alfonso XIII.—Purser refused to furnish passenger list to American consul at Bilbao.

Information of this nature was collected and distributed to the various ports of entry in order that all the movements of such vessels could be carefully watched.

In addition to the inspection of incoming ships as described above a very important part of the duties of the aide for information was the inspection of outgoing ships to make sure that large amounts of material that could be used on German submarines were not being smuggled in the ship's stores or in other unauthorized places.

When leaving American ports neutral vessels were accustomed to carry an enormous quantity of spare machinery and electrical parts, many times more than was necessary. Up to this time these spare parts were usually taken on board in this country, but seldom entered on their manifests, and when the vessel returned to port they were found missing. In fact, many of these articles were unnecessary; for example, boiler tubes, condenser tubes, and boiler zincs went into Germany in large quantities by such channels.

Radio apparatus was frequently purchased by vessels while lying in port and installed on board in the guise of repairs. By this method large amounts of apparatus was taken on board and connected up to the existing apparatus in the radio room, and when the vessels returned the new apparatus was found to be missing.

Next to the supplies mentioned above the most important article taken out in quantity was lubricating oil. Ships constantly left for a trip to Holland with enough oil to take them around the world, yet on their return they had barely enough to get into port.

The necessity of such inspections can be seen when the examination of the steamship *Ryndam* showed she had on board 750,000 pounds of copper in bars, strips, cakes, and wire; 250,000 pounds of brass in tubes, sheets, etc., and 1,700 barrels of lubricating oil and some 70,000 feet of aerial wire—silicon bronze; none of which articles appeared on the ship's manifest.

As officers for ship inspection work were of vital importance, and as officers for these duties were not available, certain men were selected owing to their particular ability to carry out this work. These men were enlisted and many commissioned.

It became possible to check up a number of these ship's stores through ship chandlers, who cooperated with this organization, and as a result many masters of merchant vessels were fined for making fraudulent manifests. As a result of this it was determined to immediately start an investigation of the character and source of shipments and also investigations in regard to enemy goods in storage.

The Office of Naval Intelligence first made a list of all materials covering agricultural or manufactured, in storage at the port of New York. It then became the business of the office to be informed as to all facts of a suspicious nature relating to firms, individuals, and companies doing business under contract with the Navy Department, as to firms whose business may be in contravention of the "Trading with the enemy act"; as to alien suspects and their activities; as to the apprehending of deserters and absconders; as to evidences of German propaganda; as to information relating to the enemy; enemy sympathizers; or suspected spies taking passage on vessels sailing to or from the United States, and as to suspicious ships and shipments.

Examinations of the men employed on the docks as stevedores, etc., were infrequent—and in many instances they had never been made—with the result that the danger from alien enemies was almost at the maximum. Arrangements were made whereby all men employed on docks were required to have identification cards, and such means of identification were then demanded by all military guards placed upon the piers. By doing so a great source of danger was immediately eliminated.

It was arranged that after a vessel arrived at her pier there was a constant and actual Government control. In no instance was anyone allowed to leave or board the vessel before the search and muster were completed. This resulted in a continual custody from the moment of her arrival until the vessel departed, and the discharge of cargoes was accordingly, in reality, done under Government supervision. To obtain the greatest possible efficiency, specialization became necessary, and for that reason searches and musters on all vessels were made by bodies of men trained for that purpose. In several cases where special searches were necessary, dock plans of the vessel were obtained from the surveyors' department.

All loose mail on incoming vessels was censored, and this included the large amounts of mail sent by consignees. In this manner there was closed an easy channel of communication between the enemy and its agents in this country.

The Navy Department also took charge of the development of camouflage work, which included the investigation of suggestions as to schemes of camouflage painting and the issuance of definite instructions as to the type of camouflage to be adopted, and arrangements were made with the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the Shipping Board for the practical application of camouflage to vessels not under the control of the Navy Department. To make the reports of camouflaged vessels more complete, photographs were taken showing the port and starboard view and a view of the forward side of the bridge of all vessels coming into the ports within the various districts, whether camouflaged or not. These photographs approached 5 by 7 inch size. The information collected by this division was turned over to the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which had charge of the developing of camouflage work in the Navy Department.

In May, 1918, the first German submarine appeared off of our coast. The aid for information of the fourth naval district was the first to report the attempted sinking of the American schooner *Edna*, which was found water-logged off Winter Quarter Light Ship on May 26, 1918, and towed into Philadelphia. Examination by the aid for information in person disclosed the presence on board of a detonating device, which was used in blowing a hole below the water-line in order to sink her. She failed to sink, however, being loaded with case oil, which kept her on the surface of the water after becoming water-logged. From that time on the section aids for information along our coast kept a very sharp lookout for submarines reported by wireless from ships at sea, which reports were made by telephone direct to the Office of Naval Intelligence. All submarines that came to this country were thus reported and their tracks on the high seas charted.

General Inspection of Plants.

One of the principal activities of the branch offices of Naval Intelligence and of the aides for information in those districts where there were no branch offices located was the inspection of plants having naval contracts. The first step taken by the Office of Naval Intelligence for the adequate protection of plants engaged in Navy work was the adoption and insertion in all Navy contracts of the following clause:

"In addition to the ordinary precautions heretofore adopted by the contractor for the guarding and protection of its plant and work, the contractor shall provide such additional watchmen and devices for the Navy Department against espionage, acts of war, and of enemy aliens as may be required by the Secretary of the Navy. The contractor shall, when required, report to the Secretary of the Navy the citizenship, country of birth, or alien status of any and all of his employees. When required by the Secretary of the Navy he shall refuse to employ, or if already employed forthwith discharge from employment and exclude from his works, any person or persons designated by the Secretary of the Navy as undesirable for employment on work for the Navy Department."

A circular letter signed by the Secretary of the Navy was then sent to each contractor by the office, together with a set of printed questionnaire forms outlining the information required by the office in pursuance of the above clause.

The forms were returned by the contractors in duplicate, each form describing the extent and nature of the plant's contracts with the Navy Department, containing a census of employees from the standpoint of nationality and describing in a general way the precautionary measures adopted by the company for the protection of its plant and the materials in process of manufacture for the Navy Department, together with a number of miscellaneous facts to enable the Office of Naval Intelligence to determine as promptly as possible the relative importance of the various plants.

Approximately 5,000 of these questionnaires were received from original contractors, their subsidiary and subcontractor plants.

The duplicates of these questionnaire forms were forwarded at once to branch offices and aides for information, with the request that they be carefully analyzed and that the plants be inspected in order of their importance.

Accordingly there are now on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence reports covering practically all of the plants that were engaged upon work for the Navy Department, giving detailed information under the following headings which will suggest the nature of the data compiled:

(a) *Official personnel.*—Which includes not only a list of firms officers, but report of any investigations which have been deemed advisable as to their loyalty.

(b) *Contracts.*—Which includes a statement of the progress made on Navy contracts, a summary of companies contracts with other departments of the Government, delays and the reasons therefore, etc.

(c) *Employees.*—Which includes a general statement as to the predominant nationality of employees, the method followed by the company in selecting employees, reports of investigations of suspicious individuals and detailed statements in regard to all alien enemies employed, nature of employment, opportunities for sabotage, past records, etc.

(d) *Precautionary measures.*—Which describe the pass systems, the number and caliber of watchmen, barricades, use of flood lights, etc.

(e) *Fire precaution.*—Which includes a brief statement regarding construction of buildings from a fire-protection standpoint and a brief description of the fire-fighting apparatus observed.

(f) *Labor.*—Which includes a brief statement of the companies experience with its employees as regards to strikes, shutdowns, sabotage, and other disorders of serious nature, causes, persons involved, and likelihood of further disorders.

"Thus the Plant Division of the Office of Naval Intelligence was in a position to keep, and did keep, the Secretary of the Navy and the bureau chiefs concerned informed of the progress of work on Navy contracts at all times; whether the proper and necessary lighting facilities were installed and maintained for the exterior lighting of plants at night; whether proper fencing was

provided to completely surround the plant and prevent the entry of men by other means than through the gates; whether a proper and adequate system of identification of employees was established by means of passes and badges and, in fact, that every precaution was taken to prevent sabotage or injury to the plants by German sympathizers, which would in any way reduce production.

Many of the plants, having naval contracts, were found to be poorly equipped for the prevention of fire and many plants had little or no facilities for fighting a fire should one start.

This led the Office of Naval Intelligence to take the question of fire prevention up with the Treasury Department and the War Industries Board which led, eventually, to the forming of the fire prevention section of the War Industries Board, of which the Director of Naval Intelligence was a member of the advisory council. This fire prevention section was furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence with lists of plants with which the Navy Department had contracts involving more than \$100,000 and which, from the result by inspection of its agents, seemed to have little or no apparatus for the prevention of the fighting of fire. The fire prevention committee immediately dispatched expert inspectors for a careful examination of these plants and as a result of these inspections, made recommendations covering what was required to place them in a proper condition to prevent their destruction by fire. During the few months of its operation the fire prevention section secured the installation of sprinkler systems; construction of fire walls; and introduced better methods of housekeeping in hundreds of plants which the Navy depended upon for its vital needs during the war.

In general the plant section of the Office of Naval Intelligence confined their recommendations to physical improvements in the plants, and to the enforcement of law regarding employment of alien enemies; together with the investigation of prospective employees. In the vast majority of plants engaged upon Navy work, very extensive and needful improvements were made, involving, in the aggregate, hundreds of thousands of dollars, which expense, with a single exception, was met by the contractors themselves. It is further believed that the frank discussion of these subjects between the contractors and representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence resulted in awakening the minds of the contractors to a more thorough appreciation of the necessity of taking extensive precautions for the protection of their plants and in the selection of employees. Very loose methods had been the rule in the majority of plants prior to these improvements. As an example, in one plant alone over ninety alien enemies were removed and turned over to the Department of Justice for such disposition as it saw fit. Many of these alien enemies were interned for the duration of the war. Many other plants had alien enemies removed and interned. It is only fair to the contractors to state that they cooperated most cordially with the representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and were willing and anxious to place their plants in a condition which prevented sabotage and destruction by bombs and fire. This resulted in a very few explosions and very little damage being done by fire or sabotage in any of the plants having Navy contracts, all of which were under the watchful eye of representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Shortly after Mr. John Lord O'Brian, of Buffalo, was appointed by the Attorney General as special assistant in his office to handle all cases arising as the direct result of the war, weekly meetings were held every Wednesday in his office in the Department of Justice. At these conferences were the Director of Military Intelligence, Director of Naval Intelligence, representative of the Department of Labor, representative of the State Department and the officer in charge of the Bureau of Investigations, Department of Justice. At these conferences all matters pertaining to the activities of alien enemies, passport regu-

lations, labor troubles caused by aliens, etc., were discussed. The passport regulations were so changed by a proclamation of the President that the consuls, in all foreign ports, before viséing the passports of persons desiring to sail for the United States were required to submit the names of such persons to the naval and military attachés in the country from which they were about to sail. In case the naval attaché considered a person distinctly undesirable he would inform the consul at the port of embarkation who refused to visé the passport. In this way hundreds of undesirable men and women were prevented from reaching the United States, and, without question, Germany was cut off from communicating with her agents in this country by means of a messenger service. If, by chance, an undesirable person obtained a visé, and such fact became known to the naval attaché, he was instructed to cable the Office of Naval Intelligence a description of the person, the steamer upon which he sailed, the port of destination, and what he knew concerning him. The Office of Naval Intelligence transmitted this information, with what additional information it had in its files concerning the person, to the aide for information in the district in which the port of arrival was located and upon his arrival this particular passenger was given a searching overhauling, which resulted frequently in his being refused admittance, or, if admitted, he was interned for the duration of the war. It can be readily seen therefore that it was with difficulty Germany was able to communicate by messenger with any of her loyal citizens in the United States.

As an additional precaution, as soon as ships from European neutral countries arrived in our ports, a naval port guard was placed aboard and remained on board to prevent the landing and desertion of the crew. It was the duty of this guard to search every person who came aboard and who went ashore, to have a certain supervision over the cargo, and to generally look out for the safety of the ship.

A similar examination of the crews was made of every vessel departing to foreign ports to prevent smuggling of letters, etc. It can be said as a result of these precautions that smuggling and letter carrying was reduced to a minimum. It has been stated that the price for a smuggled letter rose from \$5 per letter at the time of our entry into the war to \$100 per letter at the close of the war, with a few takers at the latter figure. All work in connection with passenger and crew control was rendered possible only by the hearty and cordial cooperation with the Department of State. The names of applicants for all United States passports, both resident in the United States and in foreign countries, were submitted to the State Department, who in turn submitted them to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Division, Department of Justice, and, in special trade matters, to the War Trade Intelligence Bureau. The total number of names passed through the Office of Naval Intelligence files was approximately 1,000 a day. The Office of Naval Intelligence kept the State Department informed of undesirable applicants for passports, visas, or alien permits, whose names were furnished to it by domestic agents or by naval attachés.

All information collected by the Office of Naval Intelligence on "Trading with the enemy" was disseminated to the War Trade Board, Department of Commerce, and in some cases to the Military Intelligence Division and to the Department of State. This information was largely obtained from the naval attachés notably at Argentina, Brazil, Holland, and Scandinavia. In some cases foreign firms suspected with trading with the enemy, and having branches in the United States, were investigated at the request of the War Trade Board. These investigations were ably conducted by the branch offices, particularly the office in New York. Intimate relations were established by the Office of Naval Intelligence with the Bureau of War Trade Intelligence, which

thoroughly cooperated with the Navy in holding up undesirable exports and imports, and exercising their power wherever the power of the Navy Department was lacking. The Office of Naval Intelligence received, weekly, from the War Trade Board, 100 copies of supplements to the Enemy Trading List, together with additions and changes to the list, and rules and regulations of the War Trade Board. These were distributed to all the branch offices of Naval Intelligence and to all the naval attachés abroad.

Before our entry into the war the duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence was confined to collecting information from abroad, principally concerning the matériel of foreign navies; changes in ship design; the expansion of foreign navies, and the advances made in the designs of new ships, etc. This information was received, filed and placed at the disposal of any officer who desired to look up technical questions concerning foreign ships. As soon as war was declared, in April, 1917, a section of the Office of Naval Intelligence was instructed to compile this information and to disseminate it not only to bureaus of the Navy Department, which were particularly interested, but to all our forces afloat, at home and abroad. These reports soon increased in number so that it became necessary to mimeograph the compilations made from them, and to distribute them to the fleet and others concerned. First, we got out a mimeograph compilation once a month; then twice a month, and later, these got so bulky that it was necessary to print them; and by the end of the war the mailing list contained about 450 names.

In addition to this semimonthly compilation (which was confidential), other reports were printed which were of a more secret nature and were disseminated to a very limited number of officers. In this way, commander in chiefs, force commanders, and division commanders were kept informed, at all times, of the activity of the fleets of the allied powers; of the enemy fleet; of the ships sunk and their total tonnage; with the number of enemy submarines in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean; with the tracks they had made, and, in general, all efforts made by the allied and associate powers to end the war. Not only were the naval activities reported on, but many reports covering the activities of the armies in the field on all fronts were printed and disseminated. The section of the Office of Naval Intelligence which got out these compilations deserves the greatest possible credit for keeping the Navy at large—ashore and afloat—in close touch with the operations of the fleets of all the combatants.

When the armistice came there were 306 reservists in the Office of Naval Intelligence additional to the 18 civil service clerks and messengers serving at the beginning of the war, or a total of 324. This force will be reduced on July 1, 1920, to 18 of the statutory roll and 24 former reservists, or a total of 42. The organization of the office is simplicity itself in that it consists of four sections:

Section A, administrative;

Section B, intelligence (or incoming information);

Section C, compiling (or manufacturing department);

Section D, historical section (or by-products).

In by-products, for instance, we include (1) the naval library; (2) the dead files, which includes war diaries of all ships and stations and their correspondence during the war; (3) statistics; and (4) international law questions and cases which arose during the war. The compiling section works over a good deal of information that comes in to put it in more useful form. A monthly bulletin

of confidential information on naval progress is issued and this section also prepares monographs of various kinds on various countries and subjects. All information that is received is routed out to the various Government departments to which it is considered it will be of use. The State Department and Military Intelligence receive, of course, practically all that we get of general value. Special information we send to the various departments of the Government such as the Department of Justice. The attitude of the office is that it is its duty to collect and furnish information but not necessarily to advise or suggest.

The State Department is organizing a foreign-intelligence section, and it is proposed later to ask Congress for authority to send out scientific attachés to certain embassies and legations. The recent war taught the necessity of organizing science in this country, and the National Research Council, under the National Academy of Sciences, is now seeking to organize research in all domains of science. The question of how far the naval and military attachés can carry on the collection of scientific data without the presence of an actual scientific attaché is a question. The naval and military attachés, of course, have the diplomatic duty of cultivating friendly relations in the country to which they are sent, as part of the duties of the legation or embassy itself. Without being too conservative, it would seem wise not to burden the naval and military attachés with many duties outside of the strictly technical duties of their position. Unquestionably, the present world conditions require that naval and military attachés shall be more helpful in embassies and legations than was formerly the custom. During the war they were called upon to assist in many new and remarkable ways, such as the issuing of passports, assisting in food distribution, acting as shipping agents and route and port officers, and various other activities intended to meet conditions resulting from the war. In the main, the tendency is to resume prewar conditions as far as practicable while meeting new conditions which have arisen as a result of experience.

The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department naturally has much more to do with internal affairs of the United States than the Office of Naval Intelligence, since enemy activities in our own country are more rigidly watched through military posts distributed throughout the country than through naval stations which are merely on the coasts. Unquestionably, Military Intelligence and the Office of Naval Intelligence should work hand in hand and the military and naval attachés at each post should coordinate their work and be of mutual assistance. This war has taught us—which we had no need of being taught—that “Get together” should be the policy of the Army and Navy in all its activities.